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'I. INTRODUCTION
Consistent reasoning and predictability, touchstones of sound ju-
risprudence, have been lost in South Carolina case law concerning cov-
enants not to compete in employment agreements.1 In this area, law-
yers may be compared to alchemists in their attempts to create
enforceable contracts based on mercurial common-law elements.2 This
Article is intended to help lawyers return to a true and established
science as draftsmen and advocates, while affording judges the freedom
they need to do real justice.
An analysis of the relatively few South Carolina cases that have
considered employee competition covenants reveals that the courts
have adopted archaic rules and guidelines to define "reasonableness."
Furthermore, the courts' rote application and strict adherence to these
rules divert attention from the very public policy fundamentals they
purport to protect. The incantation of the rules becomes the message,
rather than the medium. This state of affairs suggests that the public
interest in the fifteenth century3 to protect employees from their over-
lords is still the public interest in South Carolina today. Judicial deci-
sions in this area continue to burden businesses with outmoded pre-
sumptions that are both anachronistic and defiant of sound contract
1. This Article will focus on postemployment restraints or covenants contained in em-
ployment agreements and in other agreements between an employee and his employer
that restrict the employee's ability to compete with his employer. We will refer to these
covenants, whether made in connection with an actual promise of definite-term employ-
ment or not, as "employee competition covenants." We recognize that this may be an
awkward bending of traditional nomenclature, but we believe a new taxonomy is neces-
sary to ensure proper focus in this area, which is frequently confused with jurisprudence
relating to other applications of covenants not to compete.
2. The problem is not peculiar to South Carolina, and the authors do not intend
any inference to the contrary. Indeed, at least one judge in a neighboring state remarked:
"Ten Philadelphia lawyers could not draft an employer-employee restrictive covenant
agreement that would pass muster under recent rulings of [the Georgia Supreme
Court]." Fuller v. Kolb, 238 Ga. 602, 605, 234 S.E.2d 517, 518 (1977) (Jordan, J., dissent-
ing). To compare the state of affairs in Georgia as of several years ago, see STATE B. OF
GA., CORP. & BANKING L. SEC., WHITE PAPER ON COVENANTS NOT TO COIPETE AND RE-
LATED COVENANTS UNDER GEORGIA LAW: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (1984) [hereinafter
WHITE PAPER].
3. A comprehensive discussion of the historical evolution of employee competition
covenants is found in Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv.
625 (1960). This Article will summarize highlights of that evolution. See infra notes 8-30
and accompanying text. See also Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A
Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1985) (development of the law governing postem-
ployment restraint agreements and an examination of the justifications offered for dispa-
rate treatment of these agreements). For a South Carolina case that discusses the history
in this area, see Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961).
[Vol. 42
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principles.4 It appears, however, that employee competition covenants
are the only postemployment restraints5 treated with this presumptive
disfavor.6 An understanding of the historical and contemporary basis
for this attitude mandates a re-evaluation of public policy in South
Carolina and yields a useful paradigm to analyze cases that address
employee competition covenants.
This Article will examine the evolution of jurisprudence that sur-
rounds employee competition covenants. It also will examine the public
policy considerations of these covenants that led early English and
American courts to abandon otherwise sacrosanct principles of freedom
of contract.7 Next, we will engage in a critical analysis of the five-part
test currently used by South Carolina courts to enforce or strike down
employee competition covenants. We will then distinguish the courts'
approach toward employee competition covenants from the approach
used with respect to other postemployment covenants, including those
contained in contracts for the sale of a business. Finally, in light of
modern public policy considerations and fundamental contract law, we
recommend that the courts abandon the five-part test and begin to use
a two-stage protocol based on contract law and a reasonableness test.
We anticipate that the adherence to a simpler, contract-based
4. For a discussion of this problem with respect to restrictive covenants in gen-
eral, see Handler & Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 57 N.Y.U.L. REv. 669 (1982).
5. Other postemployment covenants typically contained in employer-employee
agreements restrict the employee's ability to solicit or engage his former employer's cus-
tomers or employees or to disclose or use that employer's confidential information or
trade secrets. These other covenants will provide a basis for comparison and contrast in
this Article. See generally Kaddis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944) (discussing
the distinction between employee competition covenants and other postemployment re-
straints); see also infra notes 109-31 and accompanying text.
6. It is not clear in employee competition covenant cases in South Carolina
whether an actual burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the covenant is
reasonable and thus enforceable. The cases clearly adopt that approach, however, if only
in spirit. See Oxman v. Sherman, 239 S.C. 218, 224, 122 S.E.2d 559, 561 (1961) (citing
Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (1952)). "A restrictive covenant
not to compete ancillary to a contract of employment is . . . critically examined and
construed strictly against the employer." Id.; see also Delmar Studios v. Kinsey, 233 S.C.
313, 319, 104 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1958) (applying North Carolina law, which expressly
places the burden on the employer to establish reasonableness of an employee competi-
tion covenant).
7. For a general discussion of the notion that competent parties should have the
freedom to contract, see 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 127 (1963) (courts will
refuse to inquire into the adequacy of consideration and will enforce contracts as written,
unless fraud, mistake or undue influence can be shown). For cases that discuss this no-
tion in the context of employee competition covenants, see Associated Spring Corp. v.
Roy F. Wilson & Avnet, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 967 (D.S.C. 1976); Almers v. South Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 265 S.C. 48, 217 S.E.2d 135 (1975).
1991]
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analysis will engender the predictability that this area of case law
lacks. It will help lawyers to draft enforceable employee competition
covenants and will also help to align employee competition covenant
cases with fundamental contract principles and modern public policies.
II. EARLY ENGLISH CASE LAW
A general understanding of the historical development of judicial
attitudes toward employee competition covenants is a necessary foun-
dation to articulate what the public policy toward those covenants is,
and should be, in the 1990s. This discussion also assists in diagnosing
why courts have difficulty rendering rational decisions. The historical
development suggests that the current approach of South Carolina
courts is a vestige of another era.
The first reported case to consider an agreement not to engage in a
trade is Dyer's Case,8 decided in 1414. That court found a writ of debt
per se illegal that, according to the indenture undertaken by the de-
fendant, would lose its force if the defendant did not practice his trade
for a period of six months in the plaintiff's town.9 Judge Hull ex-
claimed "[b]y God, if the plaintiff were here he would go to prison
until he paid a fine to the King."1
A more equitable reasonableness inquiry that eventually replaced
the rule of per se invalidity appeared in the 1711 case of Mitchell v.
Reynolds." In that case, a baker assigned his lease of a bake shop to
the plaintiff and agreed, in connection with the assignment, not to
practice his trade as a baker in the same parish for the term of the
lease. Under the agreed penalty for breach, the defendant would pay
the plaintiff fifty pounds sterling. The baker violated the agreement
and the plaintiff sued. The baker pleaded before the court that the
damages provision was illegal as a restraint of trade. The court held
that the agreement was enforceable and reasoned that while general
restraints prohibiting the practice of a trade throughout the kingdom
were void, limited restraints, which operated only in a particular locale,
8. Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, fo. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414); see generally commentary cited supra
note 3.
9. See Blake, supra note 3, at 636. Although Blake does not discuss this point, it
is interesting to consider whether this was an employee competition covenant case at all,
or merely a liquidated damages or forfeiture case. For a discussion of whether a liqui-
dated damages or forfeiture provision that is triggered by a breach of an employee com-
petition covenant would be enforceable under existing South Carolina law, see infra note
131 and accompanying text.
10. From the ancient French, "per Dieu si le plaintiff fuit icy il irra al prison, tan-
que il ust fait fyne au Roy."
11. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
[Vol. 42
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were enforceable if the consideration was sufficient to show that the
agreement was reasonable. 2
The Mitchell court's reference to a general restraint reflects condi-
tions prevailing in England in 1711 when competition among trades-
men in different geographical areas of the kingdom was unlikely. Not
only did a lack of geographic mobility exist among tradesmen and the
public at that time, but individuals began a trade at an early age and
never strayed from it. Thus, opportunities for individual advancement
and professional mobility, which are omnipresent today, did not exist
when the "rule of reasonableness" first appeared . Nevertheless, it ap-
peared in a prescient judicial decision.
During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, industrialism
spawned the demise of the apprenticeship system in England 4 and re-
sulted in greater competition among businesses, which increased social
and vocational mobility. As a natural response to this evolution, em-
ployers frequently required that their employees execute employee
competition covenants and other covenants not to disclose confidential
information or solicit the employers' customers. 5 In the face of this
rapid change, Mitchell v. Reynolds continued as the benchmark case
even though courts applied its "reasonableness" test to new situations.
In an attempt to clarify Mitchell v. Reynolds over one hundred
years after it was handed down, the court in Horner v. Graves 6 ruled
that the determination of reasonableness was not limited to an exami-
nation of the consideration stated in the contract, but required a re-
view of all facts relevant to "whether the restraint is such only as to
afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favour of whom
12. In Mitchell Lord Macclesfield dutifully acknowledged the presumption that all
restraints of trade are invalid, but held that the presumption in the present case had
been overcome. He stated:
A special consideration being set forth in the condition, which shews it was
reasonable for the parties to enter into it, the same is good.. . . [A] man may,
upon a valuable consideration, by his own consent, and for his own profit, give
over his trade; and part with it to another in a particular place.
Id. at 348-49 (original spelling retained). But see Clerk v. Governor & Co., 83 Eng. Rep.
670 (1685) (bond that one shall not use his trade in a particular place is void); The
Blacksmiths of South-Mims, 74 Eng. Rep. 485 (C.P. 1587) (bond not to exercise trade
within the same town is against the law).
13. In Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R.I. 3, 6, 19 A. 712, 713 (1890), the court stated:
"Public policy is a variable test. In the days of the early English cases, one who could not
work at his trade could hardly work at all. The avenues to occupation were not as open
nor as numerous as now. .. "
14. See Blake, supra note 3, at 638.
15. Id.
16. 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831) (court held a dentist's assistant's agreement not
to practice dentistry within 100 miles of employer's town if employer still practicing den-
tistry unreasonably broad because employer could never occupy such a wide area).
1991]
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it is given and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the
public.' 1 7 The court also made it clear that the distinction between
general and particular restraints, so laboriously explained in Mitchell
v. Reynolds, was not intended to be a universal rule. Accordingly, the
Horner court held that the function of the court was to determine
"what is a reasonable restraint with reference to the particular case."'' 8
In 1853 the Court of Queen's Bench finally reversed the traditional
rule that all restraints of trade were per se invalid and held that the
burden was on the employee to show that the covenant was unreasona-
ble.10 The presumption that the burden of proof should be on the em-
ployee, rather than the employer, prevailed until 1913 and is illustra-
tive of public sentiment during this time. The basis for the
presumption was crystallized by Justice Jessel in Printing & Numeri-
cal Registering Co. v. Sampson:
20
It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those
rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public
policy, because if there is one thing which more than another public
policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts,
when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall
be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount
public policy to consider that you are not lightly to interfere with the
freedom of contract.
21
English courts continued to refine the reasonableness test into the
early twentieth century, while preserving, to the extent possible, an ap-
preciation for the principle of freedom of contract. The landmark case
in the early part of this century was Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt
Guns & Ammunition Co.22 There, the House of Lords finally laid to
rest the Mitchell v. Reynolds court's distinction between "general" and
"partial" restraints23 that had troubled English courts for decades. The
House of Lords decided to uphold a restraint regardless of whether it
was fairly characterized as "general" or "partial" if it was no broader
than reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the covenantor
and not against the interests of the public.2
Finally, in 1913 and 1916 two cases were decided that shifted the
17. Id. at 287 (original spelling retained).
18. Id. The court focused more on the reasonableness of the parties inter se, rather
than reasonableness in light of public policy or general societal needs.
19. Tallis v. Tallis, 118 Eng. Rep. 482 (Q.B. 1853).
20. 19 L.R.-Eq. 462 (1875).
21. Id. at 465.
22. [1894] App. Cas. 535 (H.L.).
23. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
24. [1894] App. Cas. 535 (H.L.).
[Vol. 42
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burden of proving reasonableness back to the employer, made the rea-
sonableness test truly formulaic, and generally transformed the law to
its current approach.25 These two cases, Mason v. Provident Clothing
and Supply Co. 26 and Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby27 established
the following principles:
[T]he rule of reason required different measures to be applied in em-
ployee-restraint cases; second, that the employer must affirmatively
show that the restraint sought to be enforced is no broader than
needed for his reasonable protection; third, that the restraint must be
reasonable, taking into account the interests of the employee as well
as the employer; and finally, that a restraint could not be justified if
its only purpose is to protect the employer from future competition,
as such; in this respect postemployment restraints differ from those
agreed to in connection with purchase of goodwill, for example.
2 8
For the most part, the law in America regarding employee compe-
tition covenants parallels the nineteenth-century law of England, with
one noticeable exception: in applying the reasonableness test,29 Ameri-
can courts place even more emphasis "on protecting the employee from
overly heavy burdens and less on the conclusiveness of contractual
terms.
3 0
III. CURRENT SOUTH CAROLINA LAw
It is clear that South Carolina courts look with disfavor on em-
ployee competition covenants and, whether articulated or not,31 place a
25. See Blake, supra note 3, at 642-43. These two cases likewise provided a spring-
board for parallel principles that courts were developing in the United States.
26. [1913] App. Cas. 724.
27. [1916] 1 App. Cas. 688.
28. Blake, supra note 3, at 643. It is interesting to compare the elements of this
test with those found in Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533
(1961); see supra note 3 and accompanying text. It appears that the English courts con-
sistently distinguished between employee competition covenants and covenants not to
compete contained in contracts for the sale of a business. This is not the case in South
Carolina. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
29. A thorough discussion of the "reasonableness" test and the application of this
rule as applied by other American courts is beyond the scope of this Article, but can be
found in various compendia. See generally 54 AM. JuP- 2D Monopolies, Restraints of
Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices §§ 542-580 (1971).
30. Blake, supra note 3, at 644; Cf. Pettit, Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U.L.
REv. 551, 561 (1983) ("Judges often decide these disputes without inquiry into questions
of contract formation; frequently, they make no effort to explain the contracting process
or even to use contract terminology.").
31. Courts in relevant South Carolina cases do not state forthrightly that the em-
ployer has the actual "burden of proof" to show reasonableness, but that is the clear
sense of their analysis.
1991]
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burden on employers to prove that these covenants are reasonable.
They justify this approach, in part, by reminding lawyers that cove-
nants not to compete were once void as a restraint of trade.32 Although
now enforceable if certain exacting criteria are met, modern-day em-
ployee competition covenants are discussed and reviewed solely in light
of the "reasonableness" inquiry as refined in previous case law but are
not reviewed in light of federal or state statutes.33
Interestingly, no reported South Carolina decision has upheld an
employee competition covenant on the grounds that parties should
have complete freedom of contract, even in cases in which the funda-
mental elements of contract law were satisfied. Rather, South Carolina
courts use the reasonableness test.34 An employee competition cove-
nant either stands or falls based solely upon the outcome of that test.
As a result, contract law has been subordinated by judicially deter-
mined "public interest" in employee competition covenant case law, as
will be evident in the following discussion of the reasonableness test in
South Carolina.
32. See, e.g., Sermons v. Cain & Estes Ins. Agency, 275 S.C. 506, 273 S.E.2d 338
(1980); Almers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 265 S.C. 48, 58, 217 S.E.2d 135, 140 (1975);
Oxman v. Profit, 241 S.C. 28, 33, 126 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1962) ("A restrictive covenant not
to compete ancillary to a contract of employment is generally looked upon with disfavor
and is critically examined and construed against the employer. . . ."); Collins Music Co.
v. Parent, 288 S.C. 91, 93, 340 S.E.2d 794, 795 (Ct. App. 1986).
33. Various federal statutes prohibit restraints on competition. For example, the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973 & Supp. 1990) prohibits contracts, combina-
tions, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. See generally Goldschmid, Antitrust's Ne-
glected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal
Law, 73 COLU.i. L. REV. 1193 (1973); Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": An-
titrust Treatment of Post-employment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L. REV. 621.
Interestingly, no court has found a postemployment restrictive covenant to violate § 1 of
the Sherman Act. See Bradford v. New York Times, 501 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1974). The
South Carolina Code generally prohibits arrangements, contracts and agreements that
adversely effect competition, and could also provide grounds on which to find an em-
ployee competition covenant unenforceable. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-10 (Law. Co-op.
1976). No court has found a postemployment restrictive covenant to be invalid, however,
based on a violation of that statute; indeed, no one may ever have made the argument.
No legislation is currently pending in South Carolina that would clarify the existing com-
mon law of employee competition covenants. Georgia recently enacted legislation provid-
ing that such covenants are presumptively valid in certain circumstances. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 13-8-2.1 (Supp. 1990). The court in Hart v. Jackson & Coker, Inc., No. 90-5654-3
(DeKalb County Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1990) and Lindsey v. Jackson & Coker, Inc., No. 90-
5661-3 (De Kalb County Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1990) (consolidated cases), however,
promptly held it unconstitutional. The Lindsey case is currently on appeal.
34. See cases cited infra note 36.
[Vol. 42
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A. The Reasonableness Test in South Carolina
Over the past three decades, South Carolina courts have identified
five criteria that must be satisfied for an employee competition cove-
nant to be enforced. We will refer to these five criteria as the "reasona-
bleness test. '35 The reasonableness test warrants that an employee
competition covenant will be upheld if it:
(i) is necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the
employer;
(ii) is reasonably limited in its operation with respect to time and
place;
(iii) is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the legitimate
efforts of the employee to earn a livelihood;
(iv) is reasonable from the standpoint of sound public policy; and
(v) is supported by valuable consideration."'
Although based in part on earlier case law, the reasonableness test
had its genesis in South Carolina in Standard Register Co. v. Kerri-
gan.3 7 In this case, the employer, an Ohio company engaged in the bus-
iness of manufacturing and selling business forms, brought suit to en-
join a former employee, Kerrigan, from violating a provision of an
employment contract. The contract provided that, for two years after
leaving his employment, Kerrigan would not engage in competition
with his employer by selling to his former accounts, or selling in the
territory where he had performed his duties as a sales representative.
The Standard Register employment contracts8 further provided that
35. The term "reasonableness test" is not judicially created, and we are not aware
of any other use of the term in this context. Regardless of the rubric used to describe the
test, however, South Carolina courts consistently hold that a covenant that fails to meet
any one of the five criteria will be unenforceable. See, e.g., Delmar Studios v. Kinsey, 233
S.C. 313, 319, 104 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1958) (time limitation was reasonable, but employer
failed to show that the extent of the territory included was necessary for the protection
of the employer's business). See also Almers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 265 S.C. 48,
56, 217 S.E.2d 135, 138 (1975) (Justice Ness stated: "The ultimate test of reasonableness
depends on a shifting and weighing of the individual facts of each case."). Although
South Carolina courts generally follow the less exacting expression of the reasonableness
inquiry found in Almers, it is not the reasonableness test as that term is used herein.
36. See, e.g., Rental Uniform Serv. v. Dudley, 278 S.C. 674, 675-76, 301 S.E.2d 142,
143 (1983); Sermons v. Cain & Estes Ins. Agency, 275 S.C. 506, 508, 273 S.E.2d 338, 339
(1980) (quoting Oxman v. Sherman, 239 S.C. 218, 122 S.E.2d 559 (1961)); Collins Music
Co. v. Parent, 288 S.C. 91, 93-94, 340 S.E.2d 794, 795 (Ct. App. 1986).
37. 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961). Standard Register was about an employee
competition covenant in a contract expressly governed by Ohio law. Thus the court ap-
plied Ohio law, which included, inter alia, a version of the reasonableness test as then
applied in Ohio.
38. Actually, the contract was not an employment agreement in the technical sense
because Kerrigan was not promised employment for a definite time. For a discussion of
1991]
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the law of Ohio govern the contract's interpretation and enforcement.
After terminating his employment, Kerrigan immediately formed his
own business and began to compete with Standard Register. 9
Giving effect to the choice of law clause in the contract, the court
applied Ohio law and analyzed the territorial scope of the competition
covenant in light of the legitimate business interests of the employer,
reasonableness to the employee, and reasonableness to the general
public. 40 The court determined that the employee competition cove-
nant satisfied the three-part inquiry and was not contrary to the public
policy of Ohio. The court next analyzed the covenant in light of South
Carolina law, reasoning that if it were against public policy in South
Carolina (the state where Kerrigan was competing), the covenant
would not be enforced in South Carolina, even though it was enforcea-
ble under Ohio law.4
1
In analyzing the competition covenant under South Carolina law,
the court cited Reeves v. Sargeant42 and South Carolina Finance
Corp. v. West Side Finance Co.,43 both of which involved covenants
not to compete in contracts for the sale of a business.44 In Reeves v.
Sargeant the court stated that "[t]he test which generally is laid down
by which it may be determined whether a contract is reasonable is
whether it affords a fair protection for the interests of the party in
whose favor it is made, without being so large in its operation as to
why that fact should have been significant, see infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
39. It was admitted in the case that while Kerrigan was a sales representative for
the company, he was limited to eighteen assigned accounts and that he personally con-
tacted all but one of these former accounts for the purpose of making sales for his new
corporation. Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 59, 119 S.E.2d 533, 536
(1961).
40. Id. at 66-70, 119 S.E.2d at 539-41. The court also cited Welcome Wagon, Inc. v.
Morris, 224 F.2d 693, 698 (4th Cir. 1955), in which the Fourth Circuit applied North
Carolina law as a basis for these three considerations. Id. at 60, 119 S.E.2d at 536.
41. The court stated: "We know of no principle of law based upon comity or inter-
state commerce transactions, which would require a state court to recognize the validity
of a contract which under its law is declared to be against public policy, immoral and
void." Id. at 70, 119 S.E.2d at 542 (quoting Wiggins v. Postal Tel. Co., 130 S.C. 292, 295,
125 S.E. 568, 569 (1924)). Cf. Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 239 Ga. 675, 238 S.E.2d 368 (1977)
(court disregarded a choice of law clause in a contract containing an employee competi-
tion covenant because the competition covenant was against Georgia public policy).
42. 200 S.C. 494, 21 S.E.2d 184 (1942).
43. 236 S.C. 109, 113 S.E.2d 329 (1960).
44. South Carolina courts decided cases about covenants not to compete in connec-
tion with the sale of businesses long before they decided cases about employment con-
tracts. By 1961 the South Carolina Supreme Court had decided only one employee com-
petition covenant case, Delmar Studios v. Kinsey, 233 S.C. 313, 104 S.E.2d 338 (1958), in
which the court applied North Carolina law in accordance with the terms of the contract.
[Vol. 42
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interfere with the interest of the public. 4 5 With this methodology, the
court juxtaposed the criteria formulated in South Carolina Finance
Corp. v. West Side Finance Co.,"s to wit: "A covenant not to compete
is enforceable if it is not detrimental to the public interest, is ancillary
to the sale of a business or profession,, 71 is reasonably limited as to
time and territory, and is supported by valuable consideration.' 8
Merging and applying the criteria established in these two cases, Jus-
tice Moss in Standard Register concluded: "We think the restrictive
covenant not to compete limited to the eighteen assigned accounts, and
limited in duration to two years, was reasonable as to the employer,
the employee and the public, and hence, the provision is not contrary




The five criteria that constitute the South Carolina reasonableness
test are derived from decisions after Standard Register. These deci-
sions will not be discussed chronologically, because in the almost thirty
years since the Standard Register court first articulated the reasona-
bleness test, refinement of its elements ceased. The remainder of this
Section will consider the five criteria topically, in light of the cases in
which the courts applied them.
1. The Covenant Is Necessary for the Protection of the Legitimate
Interests of the Employer
Although the employer's "legitimate" interests to enforce an em-
ployee competition covenant are technically the first criteria the courts
examine under the reasonableness test, they are little more than a
steppingstone for the court to evaluate the reasonableness of a geo-
45. Reeves, 200 S.C. at 498-99, 21 S.E.2d at 186 (citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 247
(1963) (current section and edition).
46. 236 S.C. 109, 113 S.E.2d 329 (1960).
47. This criterion did not apply in Standard Register because the court was deal-
ing with a postemployment restraint. Later cases refer to postemployment restraints as
reasonable, however, if ancillary to a lawful contract. See, e.g., Riedman Corp. v. Jarosh,
289 S.C. 191, 192-93, 345 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 290 S.C. 252, 349 S.E.2d 404
(1986); see also Almers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 265 S.C. 48, 52, 217 S.E.2d 135,
136 (1975) (restrictive covenant in a pension plan).
48. South Carolina Fin. Corp. v. West Side Fin. Co., 236 S.C. 109, 119, 113 S.E.2d
329, 334 (1960) (citing 36 AM Jun. Monopolies, Combinations and Restraints of Trade
§§ 52-56 (1941)); see Somerset v. Reyner, 233 S.C. 324, 104 S.E.2d 344 (1958); Reeves v.
Sargeant, 200 S.C. 494, 21 S.E.2d 184 (1942); Metts v. Wenberg, 158 S.C. 411, 155 S.E.
734 (1930).
49. Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 71-72, 119 S.E.2d 533, 542
(1961). Incidentally, like the court in Standard Register, the court in South Carolina
Financial Corp. never articulated the "public policy" they sought to protect.
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graphic restriction in that covenant.50 Courts rarely examine the em-
ployer's interests in and of themselves.
Although not discussed in any reported South Carolina decision,
employers have many legitimate interests in using employee competi-
tion covenants. 1 For example, employers have an interest in training
their employees and a concomitant interest to ensure that the invest-
ment in this training is recouped to some extent, and that the training,
particularly if specialized, is not used against them by former employ-
ees.2 Likewise, employers have a legitimate interest in ensuring that
their confidential information and trade secrets53 are not used by a
competitor. No South Carolina court in a reported decision regarding
employee competition covenants, however, has ever examined these or
other legitimate expectations or rights of employers.
This first criterion goes to the heart of at least one expression of
modern public policy-that the public has an interest in the ability of
businesses to safeguard their capital against pirating, counterfeiting,
and unfair use by former employees. 4 This interest or policy is at log-
gerheads with traditional public policy in the area of employee compe-
tition covenants, namely, that individuals have a right to practice their
chosen trade and that society benefits from "fair" competition. 5 The
ability of courts to reconcile these competing interests will be facili-
tated by the new analytical approach to employee competition cove-
nants set forth in this Article.
50. See infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
51. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 13-14, (listing and discussing five "legiti-
mate" interests including (1) protection of trade secrets and confidential information, (2)
preservation of customer relations, (3) protection of investments in employer training,
(4) securing exclusive use of unique talents of key employees, and (5) in the sale of busi-
ness context, the preservation of goodwill). See also Comment, supra note 3, at 716 (cov-
enants not to compete protect against disclosure of information and protect investments
in training).
52. Numerous commentators have written about the investment a business makes
in its employees or "human capital." See generally Rubin & Shedd, Human Capital and
Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 95-96 (1981) (employers usually pay
for general training in the form of reduced wages, but determining who should pay for
training depends on the employer's perceived return on his investment in that training);
Note, Economic and Critical Analyses of the Law of Covenants Not to Compete, 72
GEO. L.J. 1425 (1984).
53. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
54. South Carolina generally prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices .... ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976). It
appears, however, that this statute has never been used in the postemployment context
in a reported South Carolina case. Cf. supra note 33 and accompanying text with respect
to federal and state antitrust laws.
55. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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2. The Covenant Is Reasonably Limited in Operation with Respect
to Time and Place
a. Geography
The territorial scope of an employee competition covenant will
render the restraint unreasonable if it covers a geographic area broader
than is necessary to protect the "legitimate interest" of the employer5 s
The courts have expanded this element of the test by declaring that a
covenant, to be enforceable, must be limited to the area in which the
employee actually worked." In 1958, three years before the Standard
Register decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided Delmar
Studios v. Kinsey.58 The court, applying North Carolina law, stated
that a restrictive covenant "must not restrain [the employee's] activi-
ties in a territory into which his former work has not taken him or
given him the opportunity to enjoy undue advantage in later competi-
tion with his employer."5 9 The Delmar court disregarded the geo-
graphic scope of the employee competition covenant because the area
in which the employee actually worked was smaller than the area de-
scribed in the covenant.60
Three years later, in the same year as Standard Register, this crit-
ical analysis of the employee's territory was applied in Oxman v. Sher-
man,6 ' which involved an employment contract entered into between
56. See Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 66, 119 S.E.2d 533, 539
(1961).
57. See Rental Uniform Serv. v. Dudley, 278 S.C. 674, 676, 301 S.E.2d 142, 143
(1983) ("A geographic restriction is generally reasonable if the area covered by the re-
straint is limited to the territory in which the employee was able, during the term of his
employment, to establish contact with his employer's customers."); Oxman v. Sherman,
239 S.C. 218, 225, 122 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1961).
58. 233 S.C. 313, 104 S.E.2d 338 (1958).
59. Id. at 321, 104 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting Wisconsin Ice & Coal Co. v. Lueth, 213
Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819 (1933)). In Delmar the employee, Kinsey, signed an employment
contract which stated that for a period of two years following the date of termination of
his employment, he would not "engage in, or become financially interested in the busi-
ness of soliciting and procuring from schools within the Territory applications for photo-
graphs or yearbook contracts, or in the business of taking of photographs in the fulfill-
ment of any such contract .... ." Id. at 316, 104 S.E.2d at 339.
60. Id. at 319-20, 104 S.E.2d at 341. The court found that the time limitation was
reasonable, but that the employer failed to prove that the extent of the territory was
necessary for the protection of its business. The territory mentioned in the contract cov-
ered approximately three-fourths of the state of North Carolina, all of South Carolina,
and eleven counties of Georgia. Id. at 316, 104 S.E.2d at 339. During his employment,
Kinsey was assigned to ten counties in South Carolina, six counties in Georgia, and at no
time did he solicit business in North Carolina. Id.
61. 239 S.C. 218, 122 S.E.2d 559 (1961).
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an insurance company and its agent in 1956. The contract provided:
While the agent is soliciting applications for policies of insurance is-
sued by the Company . .. and for a period of one year thereafter,
agent agrees that he will not directly or indirectly be connected with
any other health and accident or life insurance company engaged in
similar business to the business conducted by the [employer] in any
territory within the State of South Carolina. 2
After signing the contract, the agent's territory was revised to consist
only of Orangeburg and Calhoun counties. The employer later pro-
moted the agent to field manager over all agents in South Carolina, a
position that required him to travel to every county in the state. In
1961 the agent left the company and became a licensed agent for an-
other insurance company. The employer subsequently sued to enforce
the covenant. The court held that the covenant was too broad to be
enforceable and that in any event, the one-year period had expired.6 3
The court's reasoning suggests two nuances of the geographic cri-
terion. First, in order to have an enforceable covenant, the employer
must limit the scope to an area in which the employee works or with
which the employee is to come in contact.6 ' Obviously, the actual ex-
tent of the area may be impossible to determine at the outset of em-
ployment.65 Second, if the employer's attorney drafts a contract con-
taining a territorial restriction identical to the area with which the
employee comes in contact during his employment, that contract would
have to be amended, or a new contract entered into, any time that area
changed. 8
The court in Oxman v. Sherman afforded significant protection to
the employee and gave little consideration to basic contract principles.
The court did not define the public policy it sought to protect 7 or the
62. Id. at 222, 122 S.E.2d at 560.
63. Id. at 224.25, 122 S.E.2d at 562.
64. Id. at 225, 122 S.E.2d at 562 (citing Delmar Studios v. Kinsey, 233 S.C. 313, 104
S.E.2d 338 (1958)).
65. The same problem exists when a company has offices or does business in vari-
ous areas, but the employee only physically works at one office or in one area. This situa-
tion presents problems in drafting enforceable employee competition covenants for most
sophisticated state-wide and national businesses.
66. The employer who requires that an employee enter into a new covenant after
he is employed, without granting the employee a bonus, an increase in salary, or a pro-
motion, may be left with a covenant which is unenforceable for lack of sufficient consid-
eration. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
67. The contract at issue also contained a covenant that in the event of the termi-
nation of the agent's association with the company, he would not induce any employees
to terminate their association with the company. As to this covenant, the court did men-
tion public policy, stating that the covenant is reasonable and violates no public policy.
Oxman v. Sherman 239 S.C. 218, 226, 122 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1961).
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actual effect the covenant had, or would have had, on the legitimate
efforts of the employee to earn a livelihood. The case further suggests
that South Carolina courts, in their zeal to defend the employee,
merely shop the five criteria of the reasonableness test to identify those
which the competition covenant will fail to meet.68
b. Time
The courts have given very little guidance about what constitutes
a reasonable time except to say that a restraint against competition "at
any time" cannot be justified. 9 In Delmar the court only made men-
tion of the two-year time restraint at issue as being "reasonable" and
then found the covenant unenforceable on other grounds.70 Later, in
Rental Uniform Service v. Dudley7' the court found repose in the fol-
lowing tautology:
The three-year time restraint is only a year longer than the two-year
restraint described as reasonable in Delmar Studios of the Carolinas
v. Kinsey. The Court in Sermons stated that a limitation of two or
three years, may not be obnoxious in the context of a noncompetition
agreement, while in that case the restraint at "any time" could not be
justified. Consequently, the time limitation alone is not
unreasonable.72
Likewise, in Oxman v. Sherman s7 Justice Oxner explained that
shortly after execution of the contract, the defendant ceased working
as an agent; thus, the clock began to run on the one-year restraint.7 4
Interestingly, the defendant never questioned when the one-year pe-
riod was to begin.7
5
68. This point calls into question Justice Ness's statement in Almers about weigh-
ing and balancing the facts of each case. Almers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 265 S.C.
48, 56, 217 S.E.2d 135, 138 (1975) (see supra note 35). This quote suggests that the court
is doing more justifying than true weighing.
69. Sermons v. Caine & Estes Ins. Agency, 275 S.C. 506, 509, 273 S.E.2d 338, 339
(1980).
70. Delmar Studios v. Kinsey 233 S.C. 313, 319, 104 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1958).
71. 278 S.C. 674, 301 S.E.2d 142 (1983).
72. Id. at 676, 301 S.E.2d at 143 (citation omitted).
73. 239 S.C. 218, 122 S.E.2d 559 (1961).
74. Id. at 225, 122 S.E.2d at 562. Although the case is unclear about the date of the
defendant's first promotion, it appears that it was very soon after he executed the con-
tract. The record reflects the contract was executed on October 2, 1956, "soon thereafter"
he was promoted to unit manager to supervise and train new agents, and that "on or
about the first part of 1958" he was promoted to the position of field manager. Id.
75. The question of when a postemployment feature of a covenant should begin
and end is the subject of considerable debate. Although this Article purposefully avoids
the issue of remedies, it is noteworthy that several authorities have argued that the time
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South Carolina courts have failed to provide an adequate bench-
mark of what constitutes a reasonable time. As a result, employers and
their attorneys have little guidance to determine what the duration of
an employee competition covenant may be. Perhaps more harmful
than the court's specific failure to offer meaningful clues about what
constitutes a "reasonable" time is its general failure to clarify how a
reasonable time period in one instance may be unreasonable in an-
other. Doubtless, this failure has led to the widespread belief among
lawyers that a three-year restraint fails within some magical safe har-
bor.76 Indeed, it may be that a five- or ten-year restraint would be rea-
sonable if other considerations were met.77 Thus, the issue of temporal
reasonableness is at least inextricably related to the other elements of
the reasonableness test. Furthermore, the time limitation itself in a
given case cannot be weighed or measured against time limitations ap-
proved or disapproved in other cases, regardless of their factual
similarity.
3. The Covenant Cannot Be Unduly Harsh by Curtailing the
Legitimate Efforts of the Employee to Earn a Livelihood
Courts seldom discuss this criterion except to say it is necessary to
determine whether an employee competition covenant is enforceable.
7 8
Yet this criterion would appear to be the most critical in light of the
public interest these cases apparently seek to protect.79 Therefore, the
absence of a meaningful discussion of it in the decided cases is surpris-
ing. Indeed, if an employee has a legitimate way to earn a livelihood
without being in breach of a covenant, is the covenant a restraint of
trade at all, and should the terms of the covenant be as carefully
scrutinized?
Notwithstanding their silence on the matter, South Carolina
courts do consider the interests of the employee. Protection of the em-
ployee is a general theme that runs throughout all employee competi-
should begin only after the employee is enjoined, or ceases, from competing in violation
of a covenant. See, e.g., Comment, Economic and Critical Analysis of the Law of Cove-
nants Not to Compete, 72 GEo. L. J. 1425 (1984).
76. This perception is based on many conversations with other attorneys and a
review of many employee competition covenants drafted by other attorneys.
77. WrTE PAPER, supra note 2, at 12, suggestsa six-month safe harbor.
78. See Rental Uniform Serv. v. Dudley, 278 S.C. 674, 675, 301 S.E.2d 142, 143
(1983); Sermons v. Caine & Estes Ins. Agency, 275 S.C. 506, 508, 273 S.E.2d 338, 339
(1980); Collins Music Co. v. Parent, 288 S.C. 91, 93, 340 S.E.2d 794, 795 (Ct. App. 1986).
79. The right of every person to practice his chosen trade is the very public policy
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tion covenant cases.80 Still, more often than not, courts strike down
covenants based upon overbroad time or geographic elements without
ever reaching a discussion of the employee's ability to earn a liveli-
hood.81 The basis for courts to find a restraint to be overbroad is often
that it is greater than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of
the employer.8 2 In fact, no South Carolina case has held that an em-
ployee competition covenant meets each of the other criteria of the
reasonableness test, but is unenforceable solely because the employee
is unable to earn a livelihood elsewhere. Clearly, this is the very policy
these cases appear to invoke-that one has the right to practice one's
chosen trade.
4. The Covenant Must Be Reasonable from the Standpoint of
Sound Public Policy
The most puzzling feature of the law of employee competition cov-
enants in South Carolina is the absence of any meaningful discussion
of public policy. Almost every decided case mentions it, but no case
analyzes it.8 3 The approach of the courts is to address each of the other
80. See, e.g., Sermons, 275 S.C. at 509, 273 S.E.2d at 339 (covenant restricting
competition throughout the entire state was an unwarranted limitation on the em-
ployee's right to earn a livelihood); Oxman v. Sherman, 239 S.C. 218, 225, 122 S.E.2d
559, 561 (1961) (the one-year time restraint had already run based upon the wording of
the contract, an issue that the employee had not even raised in the defense of his case);
Delmar Studios v. Kinsey, 233 S.C. 313, 319, 104 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1958) (territory cov-
ered in the covenant was too extensive and the employer had the burden to show that it
was necessary for the reasonable protection of its business).
81. See cases cited supra note 64. In each of these cases the court did not discuss
the employee's interest. However, the employee was sufficiently protected by the
outcome.
82. See supra notes 56, 60 and accompanying text.
83. We are reminded of Justice Stewart's characterization of pornography as "I
know it when I see it" in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
See also cases cited supra notes 50, 68, 78 and accompanying text. One employee compe-
tition case that does discuss public policy is Associated Spring Corp. v. Roy F. Wilson &
Avnet, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 967 (D.S.C. 1976). The court discussed a different type of pub-
lic policy, one which precludes enforcement of a contract by a party who has breached
that very contract. The court found that the employer breached the employment con-
tract which contained the employee competition covenant. As to the reasonableness of
the covenant, the court cited Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d
533 (1961), for the principal that enforcement should be allowed only when the covenant
is reasonable and consistent with sound public policy. It stated:
To defer to the concern for sound public policy mandated by Kerrigan, it
seems imperative that this court recognize that a covenant otherwise reasona-
ble in form and scope may become unreasonable and unenforceable when en-
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criteria and presume that if the covenant satisfies them, the interests
of the public will be protected. Clearly, if the court wants to protect
public policy, a balancing of interests that genuinely focuses on the
public, rather than on individuals in specific factual settings, must
exist.
Under early English common law, public policy seemed to man-
date tipping the scales of justice in favor of the employee by placing
the burden upon the employer to prove that the covenant was neces-
sary for the protection of his business."' For the public truly to be pro-
tected in modern society, however, perhaps the burden should be on
neither the employer nor the employee, assuming that the employee is
adequately protected by other principles of common law. 5 Today, the
public has as much of an interest in protecting the interests of legiti-
mate businesses as it does in protecting those businesses' employees.88
Indeed, if an employer takes advantage of its employee in the context
of an employment agreement by either falling to provide "sufficient"
consideration for the covenant or by compelling the employee to sign
under duress, the covenant will fail under a general contract analysis.
These safeguards may obviate the need for an examination of public
policy and could allow the courts to peel back the public policy con-
cerns that encase this line of decisions.
5. The Covenant Must Be Supported by Valuable Consideration
The final criterion included in the reasonableness test is that the
employee competition clause be supported by valuable consideration.
This criterion, both in its application by the courts and in its location
within the reasonableness test, is clearly misplaced: it should be first
rather than last. The effect of this misplacement is not, however,
merely academic for either lawyers or judges. Because an analysis of
consideration is obscured and diluted by the other elements of the rea-
sonableness test, when lawyers draft employee competition covenants
and give advice about administration of contracts containing such cov-
enants, they routinely overlook the consideration requirement.8 7 Ar-
Associated Spring Corp., 410 F. Supp. at 977. The court's concern for public policy was
obscured by its valid treatment of a contract under sound principles of equity. This
raises the question whether equity and public policy are really coextensive.
84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
86. For example, businesses have a legitimate interest to protect their financial in-
vestment in employees in the form of specialized training and to protect trade secrets
and confidential information. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
87. The requirement of consideration may be satisfied in various ways other than
by drafting a contract with comprehensive recitals of facts or by paying money to the
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guably, and in their defense, lawyers become so preoccupied with satis-
fying other reasonableness test criteria that they overlook the basics,
such as the requirement of sufficient consideration.
In traditional contract cases, courts have refused'to address the
sufficiency or adequacy of consideration."8 In employee competition
covenant cases, by examining consideration in the context of reasona-
bleness instead of fundamental contract law, however, courts have de-
parted from the well-established doctrine that the adequacy of consid-
eration is assumed.8 9 Although the adequacy of consideration is
examined in many employee competition covenant cases, the treatment
of the requirement of adequacy is heightened in cases of at-will em-
ployment and those in which the alleged consideration is continued
employment.9 0
In South Carolina, the promise of at-will employment is generally
considered sufficient consideration to support an employee competition
covenant in a contract.9' In Riedman the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals considered an employee competition covenant contained in an
employment contract that "could be terminated by either party at any
time upon written notice to the other." 9' In addressing the issue, the
court remarked "we have been unable to locate a South Carolina deci-
sion concerning the question of whether an at-will employment con-
tract provides sufficient consideration for a covenant not to
employee. Likewise, careless contract administration can result in a failure of considera-
tion. For example, if a new employee is asked to sign an employment agreement the day
after he accepts the job, consideration to support an employee competition covenant in
the agreement may be absent, because the offer of employment was accepted by the
employee the day before. An employer who wishes to have existing employees sign agree-
ments containing certain employee competition covenants can avoid this problem by of-
fering the employees a raise, bonus, or promotion contingent on the employee signing the
agreement.
88. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 4.4, 4.6 (3d ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 comment c (1981).
89. See, e.g., Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987);
Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 73, 119 S.E.2d 533, 543 (1961); Riedman
Corp. v. Jarosh, 289 S.C. 191, 193, 345 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 290 S.C. 252, 349
S.E.2d 404 (1986); see also Admar, Inc. v. Satterwhite, 37 N.C. App. 410, 414, 246 S.E.2d
165, 167 (1978). See generally Note, Consideration for Employee Noncompetition Cove-
nants in Employments at Will, 54 FORDHAMt L. REV. 1123, 1127 (1986). For law in other
jurisdictions, see Annotation, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Em-
ployment Contract, as Affected by Territorial Extent of Restriction, 43 A.L.R.2D 94
(Later Case Serv. 1980 & Supp. 1989).
90. See, e.g., Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. at 481, 357 S.E.2d at 452 (at-will em-
ployment); Standard Register, 238 S.C. at 54, 119 S.E.2d at 533 (mere continued em-
ployment not sufficient consideration); Riedman, 289 S.C. at 191, 345 S.E.2d at 732 (at-
will employment).
91. See Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. at 484, 357 S.E.2d at 454.
92. Riedman, 289 S.C. at 192, 345 S.E.2d at 733.
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compete.1113
In Riedman the employee argued that no mutuality of obligation
existed in his contract because his employer could fire him at any time.
The employee argued that the employee competition covenant was not
supported by consideration and, therefore, was unenforceable. The
court disagreed, stating: "Consideration is essential; mutuality of obli-
gation is not, unless the want of mutuality would leave one party with-
out a valid or available consideration for his promise .... Since we
find good and sufficient consideration, the contract is not lacking in
mutuality of obligation. 9 4 On appeal the supreme court affirmed the
decision of the court of appeals, holding that a covenant not to com-
pete may be enforced when the consideration is based solely upon the
at-will employment itself.
9 5
The court cited Riedman in Small v. Springs Industries, Inc.,96 in
which the narrow issue, for present purposes, was whether there was
consideration to support a finding that an employee handbook was an
agreement between the employer and the employee. The handbook was
issued to the employee after she had been working for five years under
an at-will employment arrangement. The court held that the handbook
was a unilateral agreement whereby "Springs made an offer or promise
to hire Small in return for specified benefits and wages. Small accepted





The characterization by the court in Springs Industries that em-
ployment-at-will can give rise to a unilateral agreement is inconsistent
with the court's apparent position regarding continued employment as
consideration for an employee competition covenant.98 Indeed, earlier
93. Id. at 193, 345 S.E.2d at 733. The notion of sufficiency may have come from
other jurisdictions cited by the court or it may have come from Standard Register, which
states that under North Carolina law, ordinary employment is a "sufficient considera-
tion." Standard Register, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961) (citing Kadis v. Britt, 244
N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944)).
94. Riedman, 289 S.C. at 193, 345 S.E.2d at 734 (court of appeals' opinion).
95. Riedman Corp. v. Jarosh, 290 S.C. 252, 349 S.E.2d 404 (1986).
96. 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987). This case is also noted for its holding that
an employee handbook can constitute an employment agreement between the employer
and employee.
97. Id. at 484, 357 S.E.2d at 454. The court stated: "Springs' promise constituted
the terms of the employment agreement. Small's action or forbearance in reliance on
Springs' promise was sufficient consideration to make the promise legally binding." Id.
Justice Gregory, in his dissent, criticized the majority's characterization of the employ-
ment contract as "unilateral," noting that mere continuation of employment is not suffi-
cient consideration to support an agreement altering the terms of a preexisting employ-
ment contract. Id. at 487, 357 S.E.2d at 456.
98. The court in Springs Industries held that a unilateral contract was established
when an employee was impliedly bound to abide by a newly issued handbook as a condi-
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case law offers support for that conclusion. For example, in Standard
Register Co. v. Kerrigan" the court applied the rule set forth in Kadis
v. Britt,10 0 a North Carolina case, as follows:
In . . . Kadis v. Britt, it was held that ordinarily employment is a
sufficient consideration to support a restrictive negative covenant, but
where the employment contract is supported by purported considera-
tion of continued employment, and containing covenants of employee,
who occupied a subordinate position of deliveryman and bill collector,
not to disclose any business affairs of employer and not to enter em-
ployment of any competitor within a designated territory for two
years after termination of employment, was without consideration
where, contract was exacted after several years employment and the
employee's duties and position were left unchanged. 10'
Thus, it appears that the court would hold that a promise of mere
continued employment is insufficient consideration to support the en-
forcement of an employee competition covenant. On the other hand,
such a holding could be controverted by an application of the unilat-
eral contract theory expressed in Springs Industries.0 2
When continued employment is offered as the sole consideration
for an employee competition covenant, the employee is threatened
many times with termination if he does not execute the covenant.
1' 3
The unilateral contract theory, which suggests that the employer's of-
fer not to fire the employee may be accepted by the employee's contin-
ued performance of his duties, is nearly impossible to reconcile with
public policy-based presumptions in favor of employers that the court
has espoused in other decisions. Yet, interestingly, the bifurcation of
at-will employment and continued employment cases in the examina-
tion of consideration (and indeed in the examination of adequacy of
consideration altogether), apparently is derived from a need to protect
individuals from overbearing employers. However, public policy con-
siderations again have tainted standard contract analysis.
Other well-established contract law principles preserve the public
policy interest in examining consideration, leaving the fundamental na-
tion of continued employment. If this theory were applied to the normal at-will employ-
ment situation, a court could also hold that the employee's agreement to continue to
work for the employer after the employee had signed an employee competition covenant
satisfied the unilateral contract analysis, even if the employee were given no new consid-
eration. Id. (emphasis in original).
99. 238 S.C. 55, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961).
100. 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944).
101. Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 73, 119 S.E.2d 533, 543 (1961)
(citations omitted).
102. See supra note 98.
103. See Note, supra note 89, at 1127, 1131.
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ture of that examination intact. For example, duress is clearly a basis
to avoid a contract. 10 4 An employee forced to sign either an employee
competition covenant or suffer termination may be subjected to such
duress that the contract may be voidable by the employee. Courts have
gone to great lengths to protect the interests of the employee, although
not one supreme court or court of appeals case considering an em-
ployee competition covenant in South Carolina has mentioned coercion
or duress.10 5 Likewise, no case has mentioned the possibility that when
extreme circumstances exist in the formation of a contract, an em-
ployee competition covenant may be unconscionable. 06 Although a
finding of unconscionability is a severe result, it would likely provide a
useful tool in a number of cases. 107 Certainly, defenses such as duress
and unconscionability, as well as other defenses and theories not in-
cluded in the reasonableness test, would aid the courts in rendering
just and rational decisions in employee competition covenant cases.10 s
104. South Carolina follows the general rule of contract law that duress renders a
contract voidable at the option of the oppressed party. See Santee Portland Cement
Corp. v. Mid-State Redi-Mix Concrete Co., 273 S.C. 784, 260 S.E.2d 178 (1979). As to
"economic duress," the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that it will not recognize
economic duress as a separate tort upon which one can sue, implying that the oppressed
party's sole relief is to avoid the contract. Troutman v. Facetglas, Inc., 281 S.C. 598, 602-
03, 316 S.E.2d 424, 426-27 (Ct. App. 1984). The Troutman case provides a lengthy dis-
cussion of the elements necessary for a cause of action for economic duress as established
by states in which such an action is recognized. As a basis for the court's refusal to
recognize economic duress as a cause of action, it quoted the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts as follows: "[D]uress and undue influence, unlike deceit, are not generally of
themselves actionable torts; the victim of duress or undue influence is usually limited to
avoidance and does not have an affirmative action for damages." Id. at 602, 316 S.E.2d at
426 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173 (1981)).
105. See Note, supra note 89, at 1127:
The proper analysis of non-competition covenants in employments at will
should address two separate problems: [1] whether there is consideration to
support the covenant and [2] whether it is fair under the particular circum-
stances of the case to enforce a covenant that is presented after the employ-
ment relationship is already established. The first problem is one of contract
formation, the second of unconscionability or avoidance due to coercion.
Id.
106. The most refined statement of the law on unconscionability is found in U.C.C.
§ 2-302 (1989). Although the scope of § 2-302 is limited to sales transactions, it has been
used by analogy in other instances. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (defining unconscionability as "an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreason-
ably favorable to the other party."); Comment, supra note 3, at 725-26.
107. A finding of unconscionability would be particularly useful when an unskilled
worker with a long employment history is told to sign or be fired.
108. Sophistication of the parties figures prominently in duress and unconscionabil-
ity arguments. It is not a traditional element in the reasonableness test, but is considered
by the courts in their evaluation of public policy and its rightful beneficiaries. Likewise,
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COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
B. Toward Synthesis and Consistency
This Section will illustrate unwarranted inconsistencies between
the judicial treatment and interpretation of employee competition cov-
enants and certain other restrictive covenants that are closely related
to employee competition covenants in use or effect. In some instances,
such as covenants not to compete in connection with the sale of a busi-
ness, the courts have applied the reasonableness test when they should
not have. In other instances, courts have failed to draw useful compari-
sons to employee competition covenant situations when such compari-
sons would have yielded more rational results and consistency with re-
spect to policy and approach. The following discussion is not intended
to be a complete analysis of the courts' treatment of these other re-
strictive covenants, but is offered as a basis to re-evaluate the existing
approach to employee competition covenants.
1. Sale of Business Covenants
Historically in South Carolina, members of both the bench and the
bar have looked to case law concerning restrictive covenants contained
in contracts for the sale of businesses as precedent for employee com-
petition covenant cases.10 9 Granted, South Carolina courts have admit-
ted important distinctions between the two seemingly similar cove-
nants,110 but no South Carolina court has ever clearly articulated why
they should be treated differently."' Nevertheless, the basis for con-
the ability of the court to "blue pencil" an unreasonable covenant might propel the court
to be more lenient toward employers. A discussion of the blue pencil rule as applied in
South Carolina is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally 5 S. WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 659 (3d ed. 1961); Comment, Contract Law-The Status of the Blue Pencil Rule
as Applied in South Carolina Covenants Not to Compete, 28 S.C.L. REv. 726 (1977); see
also Eastern Business Forms v. Kistler, 258 S.C. 429, 189 S.E.2d 22 (1972) (court refused
to blue pencil a covenant not to compete and declared covenant invalid); Somerset v.
Reyner, 233 S.C. 324, 104 S.E.2d 344 (1958) (court refused to apply the blue pencil rule
to a territory that was not readily severable).
109. Indeed, the first employee competition covenant case in South Carolina, Stan-
dard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961), borrowed from Reeves
v. Sargeant, 200 S.C. 494, 21 S.E.2d 184 (1942), and South Carolina Fin. Corp. v. West
Side Fin. Co., 236 S.C. 109, 113 S.E.2d 329 (1960).
110. See Oxman v. Sherman, 239 S.C. 218, 224, 122 S.E.2d 559, 561 (1961) (noting
that postemployment restrictive covenants are looked upon with less "indulgence" than
sale of business restrictive covenants); see also Reeves v. Sargeant, 200 S.C. 494, 21
S.E.2d 184 (1942) (court upheld a restrictive covenant in connection with the sale of a
business even though it contained time restraints that would probably be unreasonable
in an employee competition covenant).
111. No South Carolina decision has ever explained carefully the significance of
"goodwill" in a sale-of-business covenant case. Other states have considered whether the
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trast is clear: in sale of business cases, the goodwill conveyed with the
business may often be protected only by an ancillary agreement by the
seller not to compete with the business sold,112 and generally consider-
ation is not an issue.
Still, South Carolina courts apply the reasonableness test to evalu-
ate covenants not to compete in connection with the sale of a business
just as they would analyze a similar covenant in an employment agree-
ment. It even appears that the two types of covenants are distin-
guished by the courts based only on the length of time for which they
may be enforced.113 We submit that sale of business cases are not ap-
posite to the employment cases, and that neither body of case law
should be used to examine or illuminate the other, except with respect
to the public policy principles both types of covenants may seek to
protect.
2. Covenants Not to Disclose Confidential Information
Our thesis that the application of simple contract principles,
rather than a rigid test, is necessary to achieve just and rational results
in the area of employee competition covenants is supported by an ex-
amination of the judicial treatment of covenants by employees not to
disclose the confidential information of their former employer. This
comparison also supports our position that a true appreciation of mod-
ern public policy mandates a balancing of the interests of the employer
and the employee and an abandonment of archaic presumptions
against employers.
114
conveyance of goodwill can justify the covenant. See, e.g., Hood v. Legg, 160 Ga. 620, 128
S.E. 891 (1925).
112. Typically, in the asset sale of a business, the acquisition agreement contains a
goodwill conveyance clause. Goodwill embodies customer name recognition, business op-
portunities and strategies, and profit-making potential. Many times, the only way to con-
vey and protect goodwill is by drafting a clause in the sale agreement so that the seller
covenants not to use that goodwill or other intangible property in competition with the
purchaser.
113. Covenants not to compete in connection with the sale of businesses are com-
monly assumed to be enforceable for up to five years, but employee competition cove-
nants are assumed to be enforceable for only three years. As mentioned in note 76, we do
not know the source of the three-year "presumption," but warn that it is dangerous for
the drafter to rely on it, particularly when the covenant fails to meet other elements of
the reasonableness test.
114. Employee competition covenant cases consistently state or imply that the bur-
den of proof is on the employer to show that the covenant is enforceable. See Sermons v.
Caine & Estes Ins. Agency, 275 S.C. 506, 273 S.E.2d 338 (1980); Derrick, Stubbs & Stith
v. Rogers, 256 S.C. 395, 182 S.E. 2d 724 (1971); Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238
S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961); Oxman v. Sherman, 239 S.C. 218, 122 S.E.2d 559 (1961);
Delmar Studios v. Kinsey, 233 S.C. 313, 104 S.E.2d 338 (1958); Somerset v. Reymer, 233
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Courts that have considered an employee's duty not to disclose
confidential information115 or trade secrets 16 of an employer have uni-
S.C. 324, 104 S.E.2d 344 (1958).
115. "Confidential information" is not protected by statute in South Carolina. In-
deed, no South Carolina court has precisely defined the term. Rather, courts have looked
only to the definition found in contracts sought to be enforced by an employer. Confi-
dential information may be defined, however, as competitively sensitive information that
may not arise to the level of a trade secret. See infra note 116. Various treatises contain
useful information relating to confidential information. The Restatement (Second) of
Agency contains prohibitions against an agent disclosing confidential information of a
principal, both during and after the term of the agency relationship. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF AGENCY §§ 395-396 (1958); see also Brait, Confidentiality in the Employment
Relationship, 5 INTELL. PROP. J. 187, 193 (1990) (discussion of measures an employer
should take to keep information confidential); see generally Hutter, Drafting Enforcea-
ble Employee Non-Competition Agreements to Protect Confidential Business Informa-
tion: A Lawyer's Practical Approach to the Case Law, 45 ALB. L. REV. 311 (1981).
116. Trade secrets, unlike confidential information, are susceptible to more precise
definition. Although South Carolina has not adopted it, most jurisdictions have adopted
some variation of the definition of trade secret found in the Restatement of Torts:
§ 757 Liability for Disclosure or Use of Another's Trade Secret-General
Principle.
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do
so, is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes breach of confidence reposed in him
by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts
that it was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper
means or that the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach
of his duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and
that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
Comment b. Definition of trade secret. A trade secret may consist of any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pat-
tern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT OF'ToRTs § 757 (1939). For a discussion of trade secrets law and legisla-
tion, see Day, Protection of Trade Secrets in South Carolina, 42 S.C.L. REv. 689 (1991);
Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information under Georgia Law, 19 GA. L.
REv. 623 (1985). In 1989 Georgia passed H.B. No. 252, to provide statutory protection of
trade secrets in that state. See O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-761 to -767 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1990).
See also 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices §§
704-710 (1971). A good definition of trade secrets that has been relied upon by South
Carolina courts is contained in Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135, 1139
(D.S.C. 1974) (trade secrets are subject to common-law protection and enjoy that protec-
tion notwithstanding the fact that no statutory trade secret protection exists in South
Carolina). In Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944), the court recognized that
"the right of an employer to protect, by reasonable contract with his employee, the
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formly attempted to find and enforce that duty.117 In this area, courts
impose no presumptions against employers and do not subject the em-
ployee's promise or covenant not to disclose to a rigid test or analy-
sis.118 Rather, recognizing the public policy reasons for finding such
covenants to be presumed valid, courts seek to enforce them.119
The method of analysis South Carolina courts apply to covenants
not to disclose information relative to that applied to employee compe-
tition covenants is not consistent. In many instances, the covenants,
often found side-by-side in the same contract, seek to prohibit the
same thing, that is, the use by the former employee of information
gained while he worked for his former employer. When South Carolina
courts consider the enforceability of a covenant not to disclose, they do
not attempt to dissect the contractual language and factual circum-
stances under the reasonableness test. Such preferential treatment may
result from courts' recognition of the importance of the proprietary in-
formation of a business, a factor which has never been cited as a basis
for upholding an employee competition covenant in South Carolina.
It is not clear what a South Carolina court would do if it faced an
employee competition covenant side-by-side with a nondisclosure cove-
nant in an employment agreement. Ironically, a strong argument could
be made that the former is unenforceable, but the latter should be up-
held. The practical effect on the employer, however, could be the same.
3. Other Anomalies
Employers have also managed to avoid the rigid reasonableness
test when other restrictive covenants are at issue. For example, in
unique assets of his business, a knowledge of which is acquired in confidence during the
employment and by reason of it, is recognized everywhere." Id. at 159, 29 S.E.2d at 546.
In Future Plastics v. Ware Shoals Plastics, 340 F. Supp. 1376 (D.S.C. 1972), the court
applied South Carolina law. This is perhaps the seminal case on trade secrets and confi-
dential information protection in this state. See also Servo Corp. of Am. v. General Elec.
Co., 393 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1968) ("The gravamen in a trade secrets case is a breach
of confidence, rather than an infringement of a property right.").
117. See generally 54 AM. Jun. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair
Trade Practices §§ 704-710 (1971). The duty may exist absent an express agreement
between the employer and employee if the circumstances are such that the employee is
aware of the confidence placed in him by the employer. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Pioneer Am.
Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135 (D.S.C. 1974); Future Plastics v. Ware Shoals Plastics, 340 F.
Supp. 1376 (D.S.C. 1972).
118. See generally 54 Am. Jun. 2D, supra note 117.
119. This point can be analyzed from the perspective that the employer always dis-
closes confidential information to an employee before the employee has met his obliga-
tions under the contract. See Rubin & Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to
Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1981).
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Oxman v. Profit20 the court held that an insurance agency contract
containing a covenant that the employee would not induce any policy-
holder of the employer to terminate his insurance policy with the em-
ployer was not a covenant not to compete and was enforceable.1 2' Like-
wise, the court in Dickerson v. People's Life Insurance Co.' 22 held that
a similar provision in an insurance agency contract was not a covenant
not to compete and was valid because it actually permitted competi-
tion. Also, in Collins Music Co. v. Parent123 the court upheld a restric-
tive covenant in an employment agreement and characterized it as a
covenant not to solicit customers of the former employee instead of as
an employee competition covenant.124 The court arguably disregarded
the plain meaning of the contract when it found that the restriction
was not a covenant not to compete. The court did mention the reason-
ableness test, but was not compelled to discuss its various elements
given the characterization of the covenant as a nonsolicitation
covenant.
25
The holdings in these cases are correct, 28 regardless of the method
of analysis employed by the courts. 27 The balancing of interests they
represent serves as a useful lesson for re-examining the treatment of
employee competition covenants.
Finally, the court has discussed cases in which an employee for-
feits pension benefits if he breaches an employee competition cove-
120. 241 S.C. 28, 126 S.E.2d 852 (1962).
121. Id. at 34, 126 S.E.2d at 854.
122. 284 S.C. 356, 326 S.E.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1985).
123. 288 S.C. 91, 340 S.E.2d 794 (Ct. App. 1986).
124. The covenant in Collins prohibited the employee from engaging in the business
of the employer in "'any customer location presently served by Employee and/or to be
serviced by Employee, which includes as of the date of this agreement, the following
locations.' The list attached to the agreement contained the names and addresses of cus-
tomers serviced by [the employee] in Greenville, Anderson and Spartanburg counties."
Id. at 92, 340 S.E.2d at 795 (quoting the employment agreement).
125. Id. at 93, 340 S.E.2d at 795. Covenants not to solicit customers generally are
subject to the same rules as covenants not to compete insofar as the agreement must be
limited in duration and contain an express territorial limitation. See Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Stidham, 658 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981);
Marcoin, Inc. v. Waldron, 244 Ga. 169, 259 S.E.2d 433 (1979); Fuller v. Kolb, 238 Ga.
602, 234 S.E.2d 517 (1977).
126. But see Sermons v. Caine & Estes Ins. Agency, 275 S.C. 506, 273 S.E.2d 338
(1980) (contract not to solicit customers between an insurance agency and its former
agent held unenforceable).
127. The courts did not find that the activities of the two employees in Oxman v.
Profit, 241 S.C. 28, 126 S.E.2d 852 (1962), and Dickerson v. People's Life Ins. Co., 284




Scrantom and Wilson: Postemployment Covenants Not to Compete in South Carolina: Wizard
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
nant. In Rochester Corp. v. Rochester128 the court held that such con-
tracts were not subject to the same considerations of public policy as
similar restraints in employment agreements.12 9 In Almers v. South
Carolina National Bank,1 30 however, the court held that the reasona-
bleness test should be applied even when the only penalty for breach
of the covenant was forfeiture of pension benefits. 13'
Almers illustrates the supreme court's reluctance to depart from
the reasonableness test, even when public policy against restraint of
trade is not a prominent issue. None of the decisions in the above cases
foreclose the employee's ability to earn a livelihood. In light of these
cases, one can only ask-is the reasonableness test outmoded and
inhibiting?
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE
Courts in South Carolina have created a common-law based sys-
tem to analyze employee competition covenants that neither honors
fundamental contract law principles nor adequately addresses the met-
amorphosis of the relationship between employers and employees. The
consequences of adopting and rigidly observing this formalistic ap-
proach are that the courts are fettered in their efforts to do real justice
and lawyers are left in a state of confusion when drafting protections
from competition for their business clients. This may do more harm
than good for the hapless employee because lawyers believe they can,
with impunity, restrict employees from competing with their former
employer even though a court would hold the contract unenforceable.
Undoubtedly, this leads to continued overreaching by employers; we
can only speculate how many former employees have left their chosen
trade because they assumed the contract they signed could be enforced
against them. A fresh approach to this area will lend harmony and add
predictability to a rapidly evolving body of law in South Carolina and,
at the same time, benefit employees and employers alike.
Paradoxically, this new approach seeks to obviate, or at least
subordinate, much of the reasonableness test with simple contract
analysis. The common-law support for that approach ironically is not a
128. 450 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1971).
129. Id. at 122.
130. 265 S.C. 48, 217 S.E.2d 135 (1975) (covenant must contain reasonable time and
geographic limitations).
131. Id. at 56, 217 S.E.2d at 139. The dissent in Almers argued that pension plan
forfeiture cases should be distinguished from other employee competition covenant cases
because the employee can find another job. Id. at 62, 217 S.E.2d at 142. A similar result
would follow if a liquidated damages provision'were the sole penalty for a violation of a
covenant not to compete. No cases exist in which the issue was litigated.
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case in the twentieth century, but one in the nineteenth century. In
Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson1 32 Justice Jessel ex-
tolled the "paramount" public policy to consider-freedom to con-
tract.133 Notably, the court did not jettison an investigation of reasona-
bleness, but only placed it in proper perspective. Fundamental fairness
and reasonableness have their place in this area of law, but they are
not of singular importance nor are they most effectively determined by
application of the reasonableness test.
When the court addresses a covenant not to compete it should
first ask: Does a binding contract exist? With respect to agreements
containing employee competition covenants, the elements that must be
examined are a meeting of the minds, a writing,"" and sufficient con-
sideration. Although it represents a departure from traditional contract
law, the consideration given should be both adequate and sufficient' 35
because this is the courts' most defensible basis to preserve an unas-
sailable feature of public policy: freedom of contract must be honored
only as between truly free men. Free and reasonable men should be
left, however, to bargain away their economic freedom if they choose. 13
It appears that the courts strike down employee competition cove-
nants based on complicated "balancing of hardships" tests or "public
interest analyses" when fundamental contract analysis would save time
and effort and yield similar results. For example, if a proposed em-
ployee competition covenant is not supported by adequate considera-
tion, it should not be enforced. Public policy is preserved in this ap-
proach, but complicated incantations about that policy are avoided.
Under the reasonableness test, perhaps coincidentally, but perhaps
by default, an examination of consideration is undertaken last. It
should be examined first. This threshold examination of consideration
and other fundamental contract elements would likewise allow courts a
tenable basis to strike a covenant: contracts entered into under duress
are voidable by the aggrieved party. Certainly, such reductionism
would have allowed courts in many instances to summarily dismiss "an
132. 19 L.R.-Eq. 462 (1875).
133. Id. at 465; see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
134. -No South Carolina case or statute requires that an employee competition
clause be in writing to be enforceable, but that requirement seems to be presumed by
lawyers and judges. At least, no reported decision in South Carolina has ever dealt with
an unwritten employee competition covenant; however, these clauses should be written.
135. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
136. The freedom to contract includes the freedom to make a bad deal or not to
deal at all. But see Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632, 637, 171 N.W.2d
689, 692 (1969) ("Implicit in the principle of freedom of contract is the concept that at
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action by an employer without ever having to engage the exhausting
reasonableness test.
If the employee competition covenant survives simple contract
analysis, then, but only then, should the court examine the numerous
societal and economic factors that have previously been dissected and
grouped into the first four elements of the reasonableness test. How-
ever, our proposed new framework for analysis would not utilize those
elements as such. Rather, it would call upon the court to examine the
public policy features those elements should seek to protect. For exam-
ple, the first element of the reasonableness test, protecting the legiti-
mate interests of the employer, recognizes a public policy mandate that
employers be afforded the means to protect their goodwill, their invest-
ments in human capital, and their intangible property rights. Many
times this protection can be accomplished only by restricting a former
employee's ability to compete. Obviously, when the employer's inter-
ests are given credence, the sale-of-business noncompetition cases, in
which business purchasers are recognized to have a legitimate right to
protect the goodwill of the business they are purchasing, begin to look
more apposite. We believe this approach would leave intact many, if
not most, decided cases.
1 7
A fundamental feature of this simple two-part analysis, if the con-
tract is prima facie enforceable, would still require judicial discretion
to determine reasonableness and to weigh public policy concerns. Ad-
mittedly, it is difficult to reconcile allowing a judicial inquiry into rea-
sonableness with the freedom of contract principle because if the par-
ties have made an enforceable contract, technically it should be upheld
as agreed. But perhaps the inconsistency may be resolved by limiting
the reasonableness inquiry to the question of remedies. For example, in
determining the remedy available to an employer whose former em-
ployee has breached an otherwise enforceable employee competition
covenant, the judge could tailor an injunction to reflect his determina-
tion of the reasonableness of the covenant or simply award damages.
The award of damages would not necessarily inhibit the former em-
ployee's ability to earn a livelihood, but would penalize him for the
breach.
Likewise, the courts could make more liberal use of the blue pencil
rule, although careless drafting could result from a court's holding that
covenants can be judicially reduced in time, scope, or territory. It
should be made clear that only otherwise enforceable covenants will be
candidates for blue pencil treatment.
The use of the reasonableness test as a remedy-oriented analytical
137. Very few previously decided cases actually reached an incorrect or unjust re-
suit; rather, they left no trail for later decisions to follow.
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tool only after the covenant has passed muster under the fundamental
contract analysis would harmonize employee competition covenant
cases with other cases dealing with postemployment restraints. These
other cases, with a few limited exceptions,138 already follow this ap-
proach. Thus, potential inconsistencies, such as when a nondisclosure
covenant is enforced although an employee competition covenant in
the same document is not, would be avoided. Apparent inconsistencies,
such as between sale of business noncompetition cases and employee
competition cases, could be explained easily based on the adequacy of
consideration.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the law of employee competition covenants calls out for
judicial re-examination. Unlike many areas of law, employee competi-
tion covenant law is used, studied, and relied on every day by litigators
and business lawyers. As it currently exists, however, this jurispru-
dence does not yield useful rules. A return to a simple and logical ap-
proach would serve public policy and generate modern, yet historically
consistent, tools for analysis.
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